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https://am.hg0088..com/cn/ag Liu Yuhui: My views on the economic situation and various types of assets in 2017

Liu Yuhui: My views on the economic situation and various types of assets in 2017

Source of information: Time: 2020-02-21 02:36:11

Millennium Tongzhou vitality north stream

Author: Liu Yuhui, Tianfeng Securities chief economist
Source: Tianfeng Research (ID: tfzqyj)
Liu Yuhui, a native of Changsha, Hunan, is a PhD researcher in economics.
He is currently the director of the Key Laboratory of Finance of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the chief economist of Huatai Securities [2], the director of the China Economic Evaluation Center, a researcher, a visiting researcher at the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, a professor and a doctoral supervisor at a number of universities such as the Graduate School of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Other social positions include: Risk Management Consultant of Agricultural Bank of China; Macroeconomic Adviser of China Southern Fund; Financial Institutions such as Hangzhou Bank and Independent Directors of State-owned Enterprises such as Xiangdian; 30 members of China Chief Economist Forum.
In recent years, most of the research has focused on the macroeconomic and international economic directions. The macroeconomic situation analysis report and economic policy recommendation report have been repeatedly approved by the leadership of the State Council. He is often invited to participate in the State Office, the Central Bank's Monetary Policy Committee, the Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Securities Regulatory Commission. Consultation on economic situation.
Several plays have been particularly good lately. The first play recommended for everyone to watch is the 17th edition of "Shoot". At the final stage of Huashan's sword, those masters have a common feeling at the end, "I won't fight for the first place in the world." To be honest, sometimes it can't beat. In the end, Guo Jing was first surrendered to Guo Jing. Guo Jing came up tall and said "the hero of the knight is the country and the people."
There have been many interpretations of the recent China-US Summit. Personally, it seems that China has expressed its attitude towards the United States and it is indisputable. For those who do business, it may be a relief. Of course, we also don't praise it. In the past five years, we are a bit worried about some representative views around it. For example, some people often convey a message and judgment: The United States is a declining empire. I don't know if this judgment will affect decision-making. Anyway, this judgment is seriously deviated from the global pattern today. Before the summit, I chatted with Xiao Song. My feeling is that after the "Xi Special Meeting", China's credit crunch and interest rates will probably have an upward trend. He asked me why, and I said it was simple. We traded and traded. So how does China protect its own companies? Can only come back to pressure their own currency to reduce costs for businesses. Some time ago they went to a large civilian shipbuilding company to investigate. How much did the cost of raw materials (steel) rise last year? But dare not raise the price of external orders, as long as the price is raised, the order will immediately go to the shipyard over Vietnam. The exchange rate cannot be changed. I estimate that China's export tax rebate subsidy will decline in the next 100 days, because the Americans give you a window of sincerity for 100 days. What about Chinese companies? What about our trading department? How to protect yourself? China may have no choice but to go back and compress its own financial and asset bubbles, reduce corporate crowding to reduce costs, and protect its own businesses. This is an inevitable choice. This is the first perception.
Second, it is very prudent to say "tight currency" and "tight credit" now. Some things can only be understood at the moment. You can't say it, but he can do it. Recently, there is a special drama called "Razor Edge", but in real life, a blunt knife is often more powerful than a razor. Recently, there have been many dramas. The third drama is called "The Name of the People". I did not expect that everyone in the financial circle and the investment circle would pay special attention to it. It may also touch the scene. Recently, there are many things in the financial circle and financial anti-corruption is becoming stricter. Maybe everyone will have All kinds of associations. The direct effects of the anti-corruption and special governance rectification of the financial industry are clear to everyone in the mind, that is, the shrinking of financial credit and the shrinking of financial balance sheets. We are afraid that we will face a very difficult day. This is the whole Consensus in the financial and investment circles.
The opening is far away, let me briefly report some of my views below.
Just a few pages of Di Zhai just expressed the same meaning as me. If the Chinese economy regards it as a machine, it is a highly credit-dependent economy. The labeling and technical parameters of this machine are short-term. The three things that cannot be changed are economic growth, the amount of money, and the leverage ratio. These three things are tied together. Now you must invest 6 units of currency credit a year to generate 1 unit of GDP growth. What does it mean if the technical parameters are fixed? If you want to maintain a certain speed, for example, to ensure 6.5%, your currency credit and debt ratio cannot be pushed down. If the MPA of the People's Bank of China (constrained by broad credit) is truly implemented this year, the new rules on asset management and the "three sets of vehicles" just launched by the CBRC will definitely slow down the rate of economic growth. I do n’t think it ’s important how much is dropped, because there is a psychological smoothness of the data later, but if we are the internal logic of people who are economic, we can definitely feel that the economy has fallen, no doubt.
The credit craze in China from 2014 to 2016 may also be very rare in the history of the world economy. From 2014 to 2016, we invested a total of 78 trillion yuan in currency credit (total bank debt growth), but only produced 15 trillion yuan in GDP growth. You can imagine this is a very strange cream cake, the cake layer is very low, and the whole pile is filled with cream, but such a cake just looks tempting.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
What effect does the cream have? It is nothing more than two effects: one is to pile up the elements and asset prices at various levels, and the other is to form a variety of transaction structures in the asset and financial transaction link, which is the prosperity of transactional assets. For example, the bank's net financial claims on non-banks have increased dramatically since 2016. It has increased by 10 trillion yuan a year, reached 12 trillion yuan in January, and returned slightly in February. A little bit, I don't know if this can form a trend, but it is difficult to suppress.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
We know that China ’s currency credit creation has undergone subtle changes since 2014. There is also an engine of currency creation outside M2. The growth rate of M2 is very stable. Although it is only 11.5%, the growth rate of total bank liabilities can reach 16% or even higher. There will be a contrast of 4-5 points in the middle. After 2014, China's currency creation was equivalent to M2, and the bank's balance sheet was created again. What is the space of these 4-5 points? It is the mode of interbank liabilities (placed on bond issuance subjects) to support asset expansion. My perception is that the current balance sheet of the commercial financial system may continue to deteriorate and accelerate.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
Now Super Bank also lacks liabilities. It used to report deposits for agreement. It did not report the price and the scale was not reported, because it is not saved, but it is not the same. This year, it not only reported a large scale, but also reported a high price. It is a systemic pressure to have 60 BPs in half a year.
Why are banks short of debt? Sometimes business research likes to use an intuitive indicator. Although this intuitive indicator does not necessarily have the rigorous academic support, it can quickly see the crux of the problem. I like to look at this chart. The ratio of new house sales to M2 increments in one year. We can see that it can remain below 50% before 2012, but exceeded 70% last year. In 2016, first-hand housing sold 11.7 trillion. If you add 5-6 trillion in second-hand housing transactions, it will be 17-18 trillion. The increase in M2 last year was only 15.5 trillion, a ratio exceeding 100%. You said that the bank How can there be no shortage of debt? The debt created by M2 is not enough to support the transaction of the house, so it must be created from other directions. In fact, from a theoretical point of view, the underlying source of pressure on the liability side comes from the asset side, reflecting the surge in Ponzi pressure in the economic system, which means that the turnover rate of assets is rapidly falling. Why is asset turnover falling rapidly? In Xu Xiaonian's words, a large amount of currency has solidified into reinforced cement, either reinforced cement or cream cake, which is a variety of transactional assets. Being farther and farther away from productive assets, the ability of the entire asset to create cash flow is accelerating. If you are short of money and cannot move, it must be reflected in the rising cost of liabilities. This is a result of the pressure release of the Ponzi system.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
My intuition is that this year is back to 2013, because we saw the emergence of the same characteristics as in 2013: the credit market began to freeze, and the "asset shortage" turned into a "debt shortage". Fisher (1933) 's "Debt-deflation theory" reveals the process of this transformation-a complete disillusionment of the credit bubble. Ninety years have passed since this article, and the macroeconomic structure has undergone drastic changes. Finance is completely endogenous. Today, the macroeconomic policy and the framework of financial policy were unthinkable 90 years ago, but the debt raised by Fisher Or the law of the evolution of the leverage cycle has been enduring and has never disappeared. In the following 80 years, the evolution of the debt crisis in the West has been accurately described by Fisher's debt deflation theory. This is what it is, the classic is eternity.
It is nothing more than two stages: In the first stage (downward economy + upward interest rates), the debt chain has not yet broken. As income cannot support high financing costs, debtors have to rely on further debt to maintain capital turnover. At this time, the economy is down At the same time interest rates rose. In the second stage (downward economy + downward interest rate), due to the bursting of the bubble and credit defaults, debtors identified as bad debts no longer seek new funds, waiting for debt restructuring and asset liquidation. At this time, the demand for money will fall rapidly. The economic downturn and the interest rate down happened simultaneously.
At the moment we see a similar scene in 2013, where credit markets at all levels are starting to freeze. Whether it is from the money market to the credit financing market at all levels, whether it is low-level or high-level, interest rates have risen significantly. What is the price of a 6-month AAA ticket? 2.7%; what price is it now? 4.3%, 160 BPs, so it went up without interest for half a year. I think that 5% should not be a problem. The "three advantages and one special" area targeted by a bank is the direction of enjoying preferential loan interest rates. The minimum benchmark can also be lowered by 10%, and the 4.15% loan interest rate can be lowered by 10% to achieve a minimum of 3.8%. If it does not exceed 5%, it is difficult to approve the release of money.
So I said that the asset shortage to the debt shortage, the asset shortage last year, the asset shortage may be a false proposition, because the mirror image behind the asset shortage reflects the process of adding leverage, which is the two sides of a coin, the two processes mutually self-confirmed, Self-reinforcement, the lower the rate of return, the higher the required leverage, the more assets required, and the more the organization is rushing. Let's recall the scene of China's financial market in July last year. When it reverses, it becomes a debt shortage. The higher the rate of return (the assets start to freeze), the more money is scarce. Until some assets freeze to death, they can really be freed from the "desolation." The central bank also hopes to speed up the process of deleveraging.
I know that there is a very popular point of view in the equity market. Debt is not good now, and houses are not allowed to be bought. This money has been forced into the stock market. To put it simply, such a view is that there is no concept of a modern financial credit operation in mind. Mr. Fu Peng will say later that Fu Peng is one of the few people I can really understand financial credit in the Chinese market in recent years. He has a deep understanding of this matter. I also saw a recent article, which basically has the same meaning as what I said, that is, the credit cycle and asset cycle are a process of self-reinforcement. It must be symmetrical. How can I buy it? Just go up and down. Dust returns to dust and soil returns to soil, but for many people, they are only willing to believe in the left side, and unwilling to believe in the right side, which requires time to test.
In short, what does it mean to go from "asset shortage" to "debt shortage"? Means when your credit cycle and asset cycle flip to an inflection point.
A money shortage occurred in June 2013, and the second half of the year was very tormenting. Friends who made debts should still remember the time in that half of the year. How did we suppress the upward trend in interest rates in 2013? That is, in January 2014, our macro policy made a major change, starting a super currency loosening cycle of almost two and a half years from 2014 to mid-2016. The loose monetary policy promoted further increase in financial leverage, and financial markets The process of increasing leverage has spawned more liquidity, forcibly pushing China's interest rates down for two and a half years, which is what we often talk about enjoying the longest round of bond bull market in Chinese history.
The reason why we can choose to release water and flush sand in 2014 has pushed the state of economic downturn and interest rate up, because there is a realistic basis for operation. From 2013 to 2014, the prices of China ’s renminbi elements and assets were not too expensive, and the foundation of the renminbi was still very strong. From January to May 2013, China ’s foreign exchange accounts increased by 1.8 trillion. In the next few months, China ’s official The foreign exchange deposit is still close to 4 trillion U.S. dollars. Looking at the foundation of the RMB today, the exchange rate dam has seen more and more surges. Whether it can adopt the loose monetary policy released in 2014 may not cause interest rates to fall. Because systemic financial risks posed by forced deleveraging are greater, regulatory authorities may not take this risk.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
If we look at the CPI again, it should be understood that at least inflation is not equal to the CPI. CPI can soothe the anxiety of ordinary people, but the index by which bond traders judge the level of inflation is not just CPI. How weak the CPI was in March, only 0.9%, and nothing happened. Some people say that CPI will have an impact on monetary policy decisions? I can tell you that the central bank may trust the statistics of the Bureau more.
What is the real “bloat” in the Chinese economy? In my personal experience, any indicator has its flaws. I want to understand that the most real “bloat” in the economy is not the “moving heart” of the bondholders in the market. If they feel that the transaction is uncomfortable, the chest is short and the breath is short. That must be "bulging" deep into the bone marrow. What is bond trading? What is traded is the feeling of inflation. So often the simplest common sense is the most reliable. How does the gap in the nominal exchange rate deviate from the equilibrium required by the economy? This is inflation.
I also often hear many researchers arguing whether the RMB exchange rate should depreciate? How much pressure is there to depreciate? This kind of argument often has the meaning of "Zhang Fei beats Yue Fei". After a long fight, I found out that what everyone said was not the same thing. In my understanding, whether the current price of RMB (CNY and CNH) can stand, and whether this price deviates from equilibrium are two completely different levels of questions. Whether the price of the renminbi can stand now is a technical proposition.
An incomplete market structure, the central bank's absolute ability to control expectations, strict capital account controls, and a group of market participants (central SOEs) that can be controlled by compulsory foreign exchange settlement and sales, these determine whether this price can Stand up. But the price of 6.9 may be a price far from the equilibrium, and we should know that the deviation from the equilibrium can exist for a long time, and the return to the equilibrium can also shuttle in the long space-time tunnel. The longer this time, the more negative effects the economy suffers, which means that you will stay in the "bloated" sauna days for a long time, and your transactions will be very smooth.
How far has the current price of RMB and the equilibrium required by the economy deviated? This is also a contentious issue, with various models. I personally don't use models very much, but I think sometimes common sense things are clear at a glance in my mind. What is the biggest change in China's economy from 2011 to the present? Your nominal exchange rate hasn't changed much. At that time, our exchange rate against the US dollar was between 6.8-7. Today, we returned to the starting point from the end point. Of course, we don't care about this circular process in the middle, but look at the price of RMB capital goods in the past six years. If it is not so strictly perceived, the asset sector corresponds to the non-tradable part of the economy, and the exchange rate corresponds to the tradable part of the economy. It should now be clear what has happened to the Chinese economy in the past six years? It should be a serious mismatch of resource elements in the economic system. A large number of resource elements have been absorbed into the non-tradable sectors with lower productivity to create bubbles and form so-called transactional assets; the cost of acquiring the resource elements in the tradable sector is increasing. High, tradable sectors, efficient sectors, and manufacturing industries are increasingly crowded out. In order to suppress export profits, erode its scientific research capabilities and affect the competitiveness of the manufacturing industry. This is like a tumor growing in the body. In the last 5 years, this tumor cell has experienced the most vigorous division time. With the rapid growth of the tumor, your normal organs, your heart, liver, kidney, spleen, stomach, The formation of increasing pressure until its function fails, this is the problem we face today.
Does the exchange rate affect the economy? Some researchers have said that the exchange rate is actually an exogenous variable. It seems that as long as there is a stable nominal price, it can be regarded as nonexistent. Haha, the total global demand from the second half of last year to the present is a warmer trend. Look at the PMI of developed countries and look at China ’s exports. China ’s exports increased by 4% from January to February. In other economies, South Korea is 15.7%, Japan is 6.5%, and Southeast Asian countries are close to 20%. I just mentioned the example of Rongsheng Heavy Industry. Last year, the cost (steel) price rose so much, but the order did not dare to raise the price, and it ran as soon as the price was raised.
If you consider the restriction of interest rates under the framework of exchange rates, I personally think that if China can have a new downward trend in interest rates in the future (similar to 2014-2016), the scenario I envisioned will probably be in the real estate bubble. Shrinkage and identification and deepening can only be seen after a certain stage, otherwise the range of 10% to 3.5% of national debt today may be a hard bottom and it is not easy to be penetrated. Unless it is before July of last year, financial institutions predict that the central bank will provide sufficient liquidity and continue to increase leverage to arbitrage, but the central bank's low-cost capital supply will not last forever.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
When the exchange rate cannot move too much, interest rates will inevitably be more driven by the United States. We also have to look at the situation in the United States. The United States is now facing not only a rate hike cycle, but also a shrinking schedule, and is also conducting stress tests. The Fed now holds the structure. Treasury bonds with less than five years account for 55% of its holdings of Treasury bonds. That is to say, if these treasury bonds expire one after another without reinvestment, the Fed will shrink 1.35 trillion US dollars after five years. The current 4.5 trillion has dropped to 3.1 trillion at that time. There is also a rate hike. The expression of Raphael, the representative of the Fed's "doves", it is reasonable to add two times later this year. It may be a consensus and certainty to increase three times this year. . Of course, the momentum of the current American economy is not very strong. You can see that the term structure of interest rates is very flat. The short-term interest rate rises very steadily. , Flattening-steepening-flattening. At the end of this year, when the national debt is added twice, the normal situation is that it should be 3%. If it is added three times next year, it may enter the range of 3.5% -4%, and then it will correspond to the traction of China's interest rate. What level? I personally feel that it may return to the level of the center in the second half of June 2013, which is between 4.5% and 5%. Corresponding to the factors and asset prices of China in 2013, it may be appropriate, and it was not particularly expensive at that time. , But will there be pressure on the current level of asset prices? Everyone will mutter and wonder.
I can personally understand that this rapid freeze on the real estate market with a very rigid administrative approach may not be a solution at the moment. Because the expectation of RMB depreciation is strong, what should we do if we do not freeze this market quickly? Do extraordinary things in extraordinary times.
In a short period of time, buyers and sellers of retail investors will not be able to meet each other. Today, the property of Chinese houses is very weird. It is like playing "run fast". Losers affixed various notes punitively. Who is eligible to buy? It can only be sold in the next few years. Social security has to be paid for a few years, or has to work for a few years, even after a few years of marriage, how long the divorce has been posted. Increasing friction prevents buyers and sellers from meeting each other, and a priceless market can be maintained in the short term, but the revaluation of asset liquidity dissipation in the financial credit link cannot be avoided, because the house is the most important collateral for financial credit. We In fact, I will face the assessment of asset liquidity dissipation every day. For example, last year, the house was given a 70% mortgage loan. This year, I will consider the state of liquidity dissipation. The mortgage may only be a 50% discount loan. This is The contraction of financial credit. The contraction and transfer of financial credit in the past was the upward movement of financing costs and interest rates, and further transfer was the evaluation of assets. We don't care what kind of state housing prices will take in the future. What we really care about is this frozen property market and the resulting credit contraction.
In the past two years, PPPs and various government guidance funds are highly leveraged debts. The government contributes 5%, the government guidance funds account for 15% -20%, and the priority of government guidance funds is all bank money. All that remains is bank debt. The entire trading structure is arranged with a leverage of 15-20 times. How to get it? Do not enter the government table or enter the enterprise table. Behind monetary discipline is fiscal discipline, the backbone of modern state governance. Monetary discipline is lax and loose. The fundamental reason behind it is the soft fiscal constraints. Now the PPP and various local government guidance funds may have no bottom line than the financing platform of the year. Without financial discipline, it is difficult for the central bank to maintain financial stability. Without strengthened supervision, future risks will become even more uncontrollable. A lot of things in China seem to be a financial matter, but its roots are not in finance, it hurts finances, and it destroys finances.
The growth of PPP does not represent an increase in private investment, but more of bank debt. This can be seen from the slowdown in manufacturing investment growth. I have some concerns about China's future fixed asset investment growth.
Finally, let me talk about my experience.
The first is about debt. From the second half of last year to the present, I have talked a lot about it and used a lot of artistic expressions. In fact, I just did not want to break through the window paper. We are very clear that the central point of the money market interest rate is in an upward channel. Intermittent liquidity tension is a normal state. This is not the result of the central bank's push to deleverage, because it has not really started to deleverage. This is due to the sharp rise in Ponzi pressure in the entire system. Back in 2013. Bond trading is more dependent on YY's expectation, which is louder than anyone's voice. The point on the left is very accurate. This is a sophisticated technology, and the right is more capable of running. You think about it, the bondholders are very professional, and everyone is trained by a standard system. Who do you say is smarter than others? It is very difficult to completely defeat your classmates and teachers.
The second is shares, we can see from E and P. The structure of E does have some positive effects on E, but this positive effect is attenuating. The positive effect mainly comes from the price effect brought by the previous currency credit, which is mainly the rise in prices rather than the rise in demand. An important concept in behavioral finance is called confirmatory prejudice, which has manifested itself very clearly in China's financial markets in the past period. For example, people who like cycles pay great attention to the number of excavators and excavators. From the perspective of growth rate, it is indeed more eye-catching. It can reach 200%. Why does the stock not rise after coming out? More and more people realize that this data comes from a normal equipment update cycle. The fixed asset depreciation period in China is 6 years, and the amount of equipment (2011) from the previous round of excavators and bulldozers has passed. In 6 years, it has gradually entered the stage of residual value. It has to be updated with equipment. What is the gold content of the demand? This is confirmatory prejudice. Generally speaking, it is the position that determines the head. If I buy this thing, I will do everything to strengthen the reason for buying this thing. Often I will consciously reject the information that overthrows the reason for buying this thing. It was set aside and ignored. What do these devices need to work? It ’s diesel. If demand has really recovered, why has the consumption of diesel been in negative growth year-on-year and has not turned positive?
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
Looking at this chart again, what are the factors behind the rise in profits of enterprises above designated size and the start of the profit cycle? After adjusting the price of the main business income, we did not see an acceleration of growth; the finished product inventory price went down after the adjustment, so the illusion will disappear when the lights are dim.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute
I remember talking to Xiao Song on February 16th, and said that it felt like the cycle would not be long, and I was ready to be empty. Why is there such a perception? On February 15th, rubber, glass, plastic, and PTA all showed the same trend. During the same period, China's black chain was still strong, but the interval between them was not more than ten trading days. In less than two weeks, the black color also disappeared. . From a trading perspective, on February 15th, the entire cycle has actually reached its peak. Looking back today, China ’s black chain varieties can be seen clearly. From the new high created this year to the present, it has fallen by 20%. Technology The trading status of a bear market has been determined. For example, experienced traders like to use the BDI index as an inverse leading indicator. When more and more middlemen are willing to charter a ship, the ship is full of inventory and floats on the sea. This cost is more than the cost of putting it in the warehouse in the port. Cost-effective, it may mean that the product has peaked.
We objectively admit that the risk is mainly concentrated in P. After the 2015 stock disaster, several factors in P in China's equity market should be deterministically in a very clear downward channel, which means that your risk appetite, Valuation and liquidity premiums are very clearly suppressed by the downward channel. In this state, in the stock market's stock funds, everyone ’s investment strategies are increasingly grouping and concentrating on certain species. This concentration of transactions forms a premium on assets, which is the so-called value investment. Blue chips have risen by 30%. How much tension will the asset premium bring from this group-heating trading method? I think that in the end, we may still have to accept the test of macro financial conditions, that is, the test of credit contraction and rising interest rate centers. From the current point of view, it is not meaningful to simply talk about stock indexes. The key is structural issues. What are the specific rising sectors? In this regard, the views of various agencies may be less consistent. Today's 3300 is not the same as the 3300 a year ago, it is not a thing at all. The structure is already a vicissitudes of life.
Of course, the response of the equity market to changes in currency credit conditions is generally lagging, and may be related to its transaction holder structure. Bonds and commodities traders are highly specialized and the consensus is expected to form quickly. However, stock participants are uneven and all-encompassing, the exchange of information, the hedging of different opinions, and the formation of a selection direction are much slower, but the response will definitely respond. It may also be seen that the state of holding the group to keep warm, maintaining a perfect rising channel for two or three months. It may be at a certain point in time when the degree of aversion of some traders in the market to the macro financial conditions suddenly rises sharply, in two or three days You can completely drop the increase in the past two or three months. As the macro conditions relax and maintain stability, everyone may regroup in these deterministic varieties and buy these stocks slowly again. I think the zigzag pattern is more in line with China's current macro selection, that is, the transaction under the blunt knife. In comparison, the liquidity of deterministic varieties in equity is significantly better than bonds and commodities. Of course you need to rule out scenarios where the policy would choose a one-time clear crisis response.
The third entity is that the cognition of large-scale asset and liability management institutions is basically unified to the point of tactics of chaotic markets. In chaos, the ability to realize cash is valued. Actively compressing the duration of assets, the liquidity repurchase strategy has always performed well, and the performance is significantly better than the allocation of long-term assets. Today the social security is doing this, the post store is doing this, the CNPC annuity is doing the same, and Anbang is doing the same. Why is it doing this? In fact, everyone judges based on a very simple trend. China's currency market interest rate center has entered a steady upward channel, which cannot be changed in a short period of time, making intermittent money tight.
In fact, the market is still very smart. The pricing of the two banks can be seen. The ICBC's stock has increased by 10% this year, and the Minsheng Bank's stock has fallen by 10% this year. One northeast and one southeast are actually the market. Pricing the organization's ability to manage debt costs.
Source: Wind, Tianfeng Securities Research Institute

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